Pievatolo, Maria Chiara (1999) The Tribunal of Reason: Kant and the Juridical Nature of Pure Reason. Ratio Juris, 12 (3). pp. 311-327.
This paper will propose an interpretation of Kant's thought based on an analysis of the well-known Kantian metaphor of the "Tribunal of Reason." By so doing, it will be demonstrated that the activity of reason is not foundational, but jurisdictional. The task of reason is not to form the foundation of our frameworks of theoretical and practical knowledge, but rather to form their legitimation - not as a necessity, but rather as a possibility. In addition, it will be argued that the non-foundational character of reason is consistent both with its ultimate autonomy and with its established proceedings, i.e. the procedure of transcendental deduction. In other words, the non-foundational character of reason does not imply that reason itself is indeterminate and vague (and therefore absolutely useless).
|Natural Language Keywords:||Kant transcendental deduction reason tribunal|
|Subjects:||Filosofia > Metaphysics|
|Depositing User:||Maria Chiara Pievatolo|
|Date Deposited:||30 Jan 2007|
|Last Modified:||16 Oct 2012 10:36|
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