Pievatolo, Maria Chiara (1998) An Interpretation of Kant: the Political Neutrality of Justice and the Value of Liberty. Challenges to Law at the End of the 20th Century: Law, justice and culture - Band 68 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie – Beihefte (ARSP-B), 1.
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We aim to show how misleading is to say that liberalism can be based only on a conception of liberty as a value and that Kantian liberalism, in particular, describes liberty as a value. An individual can be considered as a moral subject if and only if one can attribute him freedom, and therefore responsibility. Thus, liberty is a possibility condition for every consistent moral and legal system. However, we have to draw a distinction between liberty as a transcendental condition of every moral and legal discourse, and freedom as an empirical and highly problematical description of behaviors.
Filosofia > Modern Western philosophy
Dip. Scienze della Politica > Filosofia Politica
Filosofia > Miscellany of philosophy > Filosofia Politica
Filosofia > Modern Western philosophy > Filosofia Politica
|Depositing User:||Maria Chiara Pievatolo|
|Date Deposited:||31 Aug 2013 18:39|
|Last Modified:||31 Aug 2013 18:39|
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